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WITNESS MADE COMPETENT BY TESTIMONY
ACT JUNE 11, 1891

The 4th section of the act of May 23d, 1887, P. L. 159, declares that, in all civil proceedings, no liability for costs, no right
to compensation as executor, administrator, or other trustee, no
interest in the question on trial nor any other interest or policy
of law, except as provided in section 5, shall make any person
incompetent as a witness. Section 5 perpetuates the incompetency of one who has been convicted of perjury or subornation of
perjury, (except in a few designated cases) of husband or wife
to disclose confidential communications; of husband and wife to
testify against each other, (except under certain circumstances
in divorce cases); of counsel to testify to confidential communications made to him by the client. Clause (e) also preserves the
existing incompetency on the ground of interest when any party
to a thing or contract in action is dead, or is an adjudged lunatic;
and his right thereto or thereon, has passed to a party on the record, who represents his interest. The surviving or remaining
party to such thing or contract, or any other person whose interest is adverse to the deceased or lunatic person, continues incom-"
petent to testify to any matter that occurred before thedeath oradjudication of lunacy. To this exception of clause (e) to the bestowal of competency, there are exceptions mentioned in the clause,
e. g., controversies about the devolution of a dead man's property,
ejectments in which there are several defendants, one or more of
whom disclaim of record and either pay the costs already accrued,
or give security therefor, as the court shall direct; proceedings
which are by or against joint promisors or joint proftiisees, or
partners of a deceased or lunatic, and the matter occurred be-
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tween the surviving partners, promisors or promisees, and the
other party to the record, or between them and the person who
has an interest adverse to them.
The act of June l1th, 1891, P. L. 287; 4 Stewart, Purd. 5180;
introduces another exception to the incompetency dependent on
the death or adjudged lunacy of a party to a thing or contract
in action. "Any surviving or remaining party to such thing or
contract or any other person whose interest is adverse to the said
right of such deceased or lunatic party, shall be a competent witness to any relevant matter, although it may have occurred before the death of said party or the adjudication of his lunacy,
if and only if such relevant matter occurred between himself and
another person, who may be living at the time of the trial, and
may be competent to testify and who does so testify upon the trial
against such surviving or remaining party, or against the person
whose interest may be thus adverse, or if such relevant matter
occurred in the presence or hearing of such other living or competent person."
THE MATTER MUST BE RELEVANT
Remarks on the necessity of relevancy of the testimony is
unnecessary. Evidence wanting in this quality is inadmissible,
from whatever witness, under whatever circumstances.
OCCURRENCE

PRIOR

TO DEATH
LUNACY

OR

ADJUCATION

OF

The clause (e) perpetuates incompetency, even in cases in
which one of the parties to a thing or contract in action is dead or
is an adjudged lunatic, only as "to any matter occurring before
the death of said party, or the adjudication of his lunacy." As to
matters subsequent to death or adjudication, no incompetency
exists, in consequence of such death or adjudication.'
KINDS OF LITIGATION
The principle which regulates competency, that is announced in the act of 1891, applies "in any civil proceeding before any
tribunal of this commonwealth, or conducted by virtue of its
'Law of Witnesses, 207.
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order or direction." It must be recognized, therefore, by a justice of the peace, by an auditor, e. g., who is distributing the proceeds of a sheriff's sale2 or who is deciding on exceptions to an
admixistrator's account'; by the common pleas, e. g., in a sci fa
on a judgmente or on a mechanic's lien' , in an action of trespass
for cutting timber 6, in an action of ejectment 7, in the trial of an
issue to determine whether a note on which a judgment has been
entered, which judgment has been opened, was a forged or genuine one', or to determine who, of two claimants, is the owner of
the mortgage, and entitled to issue execution and receive the
money'; by a referee, acting in the place of the court"0 ; by the
orphans' court, e. g., in entertaining a petition for a citaion to the
administrator of a guardian, to file the guardian's account" or a
petition to compel the executor to appraise property in satisfaction of the widow's claim to $300 worth' 2 ; by the common pleas
sitting as a court of equity.'3
RELEVANT MATTER MUST HAVE "OCCURRED" BETWEEN
THE SURVIVOR OF DEATH OR LUNACY AND ANOTHER
OR IN THE PRESENCE OR HEARING OF THE LATTER

The relevant matter must have occurred "between," or in
the presence or hearing of the person who proposes to testify
and some other person, who is competent to testify, and testifies.
The matter which "occurred," must be some transitory acts or
words of human-beings or possibly 'of impersonal objects. An
inability of a sick man to open a door, is not such a matter. A
2

Building & Loan Assn. v. Bates, 36 C. C., 257; Karch v. Karch, 1
Dist., 16.
3Peterman's
Estate, 13 Montg., 169.
4
Smith v. Summerhill, 31 Super., 235.
5
Bowers v. Overfield, 3 North, 81.
6
Robbins v. Farwell, 193 Pa., 37; Irwin v. Patchen, 164 Pa., 51.
T
Dumbach v. Bishop, 183 Pa. 602; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa., 310;
Gold v. Scott, 5 Super., 262.
8
Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super., 294.
9
Brumbach v. Johnson, 187 Pa., 602.
"Dent v. Huntley, 182 Pa., 613.
"'Magoffin's Estate, 10 Dist., 473.
' 2 Odenwelder's Estate, 1 Super., 345.
13Oplinger v. Oplinger, 9 North, 316; (settlement of partnership account).
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witness who testifies to such in'ability, does not qualify the claimant against such person now dead, to contradict him. 4 A witness testifies concerning a room in the house of R now dead,
against whose estate T is claiming, that, at a time before R's
death, it was not furnished nor used as a bed room. This does
not qualify T to testify upon that subject, to describe e. g. its
contents.' 5 The claimant T against a dead man's estate, for services rendered as a nurse to his wife, prior to his death, cannot
testify that she went and took care of the wife, during her last
illness, because a witness R stated that she, E, had acted as the
nurse, and that T did not wait upon the wife, and was not at the
house as nurse.'" M and N having testified to their presence at
the house of R. E. (against whose estate, T is claiming for services as nurse), during the last sickness of R. E.'s wife, T was
not competent to testify in contradiction concerning their presence, and concerning what occurred at the house of R. E. 7 Witnesses having described the room in R. V.'s house, in which his
wife died, and the existence in it of a described stand, the claimant T may not testify that the room was renovated after the wife's
death, and a different stand from that described by the witnesses
put into it. Green, J., sustaining the exclusion of this evidence,
remarks: "The relevant matter must have occurred between T,
the excluded claimant, and the other witnesses, or have occurred
in the presence or hearing of such other witnesses." "The matters as to which T was offered did not occur 5etween or in the
presence. She simply offered to testify to the same "matters of
fact to which the others had testified, only that they were different from the description of them given by the other witnesses."
The act of 1891 applies to conversations or to events transpiring
between or in the presence or hearing of the offered witness and
the other witnesses, "and not to mere physical facts or to states
of facts described by the other witnesses in their testimony. The
act does not intend to authorize the interested person to contradict
anything said by the competent witnesses."
14Thomas v. Miller, 165 Pa., 216.
15Id.

16Id.
171d.
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WORDS, DECLARATIONS

Conversations between parties, declarations made by one person to another, are matters between such persons; those between
two persons, in the hearing or presence of a third, are matters occurring in the presence or hearing of such third person. If one
of the two interlocutors, or a third person testifies to the conversation or declaration, the other interlocutor will be competent to
testify to the same. In assumpsit by A against B's administrator
for compensation for domestic services, a witness called by the
defendant testified to a conversation in his presence between the
plaintiff and the decedent, touching the contract relation between them. The plaintiff could therefore, contradicting the witness, state what the conversation was.18 The owners of adjacent tracts, A and B built a fence. Whether it was intended by
B to mark the true boundary between the tracts was a question.
For the defendant in ejectment, witnesses testified to what was
said by D the then owner of the other tract, at the time in the
way of remarks and directions to one who was assisting him in
erecting the fence. This testimony qualified D if rendered incompetent by the death of a person to testify what he actually
said, that he did not concede that the place where the fence was
put was the true boundary, but agreed that the fence should be
put therefor thesake of peace. 9 Land was deeded to A. His wife
claims it in ejectment from A's heirs, because she furnished the
purchase money for it. The testimony of B, for the defendants
as to a conversation between the plaintiff and her husband, A,
which occurred in his presence, made the plaintiff competent to
testify to the same conversation,2 0 A's wife claiming as a creditor against her husband's administrator, X testified for him that
she had said that her husband owed her so much [less than her
present claim]. This authorized her to contradict the testimony.2 In suit by A against B's administrator, C, the latter
testified to declarations made by A in the presence of B and C.
A was thus qualified to deny the making of these declarations."
28Kauss v. Rohner, 172 Pa., 481.

"9 Gold v. Scott, S Super., 262.

20

Dumbach v. Bishop, 183 Pa., 602.

21
Karch
22

v. Karch, 1 Dist., 16.
Steele v. Nichol's Adm., 3 Dist., 517.
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CONTRACTS
The words which have occurred between the proposed witness and another, who has testified, or in the presence or hearing
of the other who has testified, may have been contractual. A
judgment between A, plaintiff and B and C, defendants, was
opened and an issue tried to ascertain how much was due. C having died, B was called and testified that a certain rent received
by the plaintiff was by an agreement of the parties, to be applied
to the note. A was therefore competent to contradict B, showing what the agreement was.2" The witness testifies to a conversation between the husband of plaintiff, who has since died and
of whom the husband is administrator, prosecuting the action,
and two of four defendants in which the participants therein,
agree to put down water pipes and each bear A of the expense.
This authorized one of the two defendants thus named, to deny
that he was present at, or participated in said conversation. 2
DECEASED NOT A PARTY TO THE RELEVANT MATTER
The matter may be relevant, although it did not occur between or in the presence and hearing of the deceased and another.
It may have occurred between or in the presence of, two or more
persons, of whom the deceased was not one. In an action by A
against B, C, D and E, for diverting a supply of water, X testified to an agreement, for some reason relevant to the issue, between A's husband (who is prosecuting the action as A's administrator) and B and C. This qualified B to deny that he participated in such an agreement or was present where and when such
agreement was made. 5 In trespass for the cutting of timber, on
a tract claimed by the defendant, under P, now dead, the payment of taxes by the plaintiff became relevant. It was assumed
that since the payment occurred between plaintiff and the taxcollector, a living person competent to testify, the plaintiff could
23

Proper v. Campbell,. 15 Super., 153; Cf. Wright v. Hanna, 210 Pa.,
349, where a party could not properly testify to a contract with the deceased because no one else had testified about it at the instance of the
party24claiming under the deceased.
Rudy v. Myton, No. 1, 19 Super., 312.
25
Rudy v. Myton, No. 1, 19 Super., 312.
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testify to the payment. 26 In a suit by the endorsee of a promissory note, who was dead at the trial, the defendant offered himself to prove that the note when delivered by him did not contain
the word "order" or other negotiable word, the note having been
delivered, in that state, in the presence of three designated persons. Had these persons testified for the plaintiff, the defendant
would have been competent."
THE OTHER PERSON MUST HAVE TESTIFIED

The surviving party to the thing or contract in action is qualified to testify to a matter which has occurred between him and
another or in the presence or hearing of such other person, not
because such person is still in existence and would be competent
to testify in contradiction of the surviving party's testimony.
He must also have testified prior to the offer of the testimony of
the surviving party or of a person adverse to the deceased. The
act of 1891 bestows the competency if and only if such relevant
matter occurred between himself [i. e. the surviving party, or any
other person where interest is adverse to the deceased] and
another person who (a) may be living at the time of the trial,
and (b) may be competent to testify, and (c) who does so testify
upon the trial, against such surviving party or such adverse person. 21 Competency is not conferred, until the deceased party has
actually put in the testimony of another person, between whom
and the deceased, or the witness for the deceased the matter occurred, or in whose presence or hearing it occurred, although this
other person is in court and is named. In a suit on a promissory
note, by the administrator of the endorsee, the defence was that
the negotiable word "order" had been inserted after the note had
left the maker's hands. The defendant offered himself to prove
this fact "not by anything that occurred between the witness and
the endorsee, who is now dead, but by what occurred between
the defendant and three persons, J. A. S., Nees and Reynolds, the
26

Irwin v. Patchen, 164 Pa., 51. The decision was erroneous inasmuch
as the
tax-collector, though competent, had not testified.
27
Sunday v. Dietrich, 16 Super., 640.
28
Roth's Estate, 150 Pa., 261; Montelius v. Montelius, 209 Pa., 541;
Wright v. Hanna, 210 Pa., 349; Shroyer v. Smith, 204 Pa., 310; Heartzog's
Appeal, 11 York, 189; Brumbach v. Johnson, 187 Pa., 602.
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two former being in court,29 and J. A. S. being the plaintiff,
(administrator of endorsee), and Nees having been a witness for
the plaintiff [but, possibly, not upon the matter of alteration].
The defendant was properly rejected, because these persons "had
In Bowers v. Overfield3 ' sci fa
not been called as witnesses."3
on mechanic's lien, the claimant was dead. Defendant offered to
testify that the claim had been paid in the presence of X, a competent witness whom he would call in corroboration. The defendant was not competent.
NECESSITY OF TESTIMONY IN CASE OF MATTER OCCURRING
NOT "BETWEEN" BUT IN "PRESENCE OR HEARING"

The act of 1891, requires when the relevant matter occurred
between the surviving party, or a witness called for him having
an interest adverse to the deceased, and another person, in order to
qualify the surviving party or a witness where interest is adverse
to the deceased, to testify, that the matter must have occurred between himself and another person, who is living at the trial, is
competent to testify, and who testifies. When the matter has
occurred in the presence or hearing of another, it requires simply
that such other should be "a living or competent person," and
says nothing about his testifying. In Irwin v. Patchen3 2 a plaintiff was allowed to prove payment of taxes, a matter that occurred
"between" the plaintiff and the tax-collector. It was treated as a
matter not "between" the plaintiff and anybody, but as a matter
which occurred in the "presence or hearing" of another, and it
was held that the plaintiff was competent although the tax-collector had not testified. Green, J., apparently assumes that the
matter "between," must be between the deceased and the witness
who testifies about it, an interpretation which the act does not
29

Plaintiff claims under his deceased father one half of a certain
rental. The whole rental is claimed, under the father, by another. The
plaintiff could not testify that the agreement with his father was made
in the presence of two named persons, unless these persons had been
called. Swint v. McCalmont Oil Co., 47 Pitts., 329; Cf. Fox's Estate,
10 York, 109.
3
"Sunday v. Dietrich, 16 Super. 640.
313 North, 81, X had not been called. The defendant could have
him, but could not have contradicted him, had he testified adversely.
called
32
164 Pa., 51.
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warrant. It has been assumed that even if the matter occurred
in the "presence or hearing" of another, this other must testify
in order to qualify the surviving party, or other person whose interest is adverse to the decedent.33
EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY OF QUALIFIED

WITNESS
The competency of a witness must be determined by the
state of facts existing at the moment at which he gives his testimony. 3 Since the act of 1891 requires the competent witness to
a relevant matter to have testified, before the surviving party, or
other person whose interest is adverse to the deceased may testify, if such surviving party, or other person testifies before a competent witness has testified to the relevant matter, an error is committed which will not be cured by the later testimony of a competent witness, upon the same matter, at the instance of the party
who represents the interest of the deceased. In the settlement of
the account of a dead guardian, by his administrator, the ward
testified to matters occurring at a settlement between him and
the guardian. Moore, a justice, was also present at the settlement. He had not testified when the ward testified. He was
however, subsequently called by the administrator of the guardian. Says Paxson, C. J., "The fact that Moore was subsequently called on behalf of the estate did not render Roth [the ward]
competent. Non constat that if Roth had not been permitted to
"3Sunday v. Dietrich, 16 Super., 640; Montelius v. Montelius, 209 Pa.,
541; Brumbach v. Johnson, 187 Pa., 602. In Montelius v. Montelius, 209
Pa., 541. Brown, J., attempts to "stop any further reference" to Irwin
v. Patchen, 164 Pa., 51, by averring that the taxes were paid after the
death of Horace Patchen. Green, J., is made by the printer to say so.
But the history of the case shows otherwise. Patchen died Dec. 23d.
1885. The witness was offered to show payment of the taxes since 1884.
If the taxes were all paid since Patchen's death it is singular that the
counsel, the court below, and Green, J., in the Supreme Court, did not see
that there was nothing to discuss. The act of 1887, clause e, makes incompetency only with reference to matters before death. It would hardly
be worse to admit that the decision in Irwin v. Patchen was erroneous,
than to admit the stupidity of counsel and both courts, in not discerning
that there was nothing to debate.
"4 Sunday v. Dietrich, 16 Super., 640; Roth's Estate, 150 Pa., 261;
Thomas v. Miller, 165 Pa., 216; Knause v. Rohner, 172 Pa., 481.
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testify, Moore would have been called."35 The petitioner for the
settlement of the deceased guardian's account testified that no settlement had been made in the lifetime of the guardian. The
subsequent testimony of a witness called by the administrator
of the guardian, that such settlement had been made, did not
validate the testimony of the petitioner. 6 In a contest between
claimants of a fund produced by a sheriff's sale, the right to
which depended on a contract between them, one of them testified,
the other being dead. Subsequently, the husband of the deceased
other party, who was present at the agreement between his wife
and the other party, testified in favor of his wife's claim. This
later testimony did not take from the testimony of the opposite
party its incompetent character."
WHO CALLS THE QUALIFYING WITNESS

The witness to the "relevant matter" whose testimony will
qualify the surviving party to the thing or contract in action, or
any other person whose interest is adverse to the deceased, must
be called by the representative of the deceased. F claimed timber under a verbal contract with N, the owner of the tract, made
in 1887; R claimed it, under a conveyance of the tract from N in
1891. In an action by R against F for the cutting of the timber,
N being dead, F called Moore to prove the parol sale. This testimony did not render F himself a competent witness. "The act
[of 1891] palpably means" says Dean, J., "that the testimony of
this competent witness is adverse to the surviving party. Here
J. E. Moore was called by Farwell, who testified to a conversation between Noyes [N] and Farwell establishing the parol contract, but this did not render Farwell competent, because Moore
was not adverse, but a witness called by himself. 8 On a rule to
open a judgment, A, to the use of B, against C, C alleges that the
judgment is for too much. C calls B, A being dead, as for
cross-examination. Upon interrogation by his counsel, B ex85
Roth's Estate, 150
36
Magoffin's Estate,
87

Pa., 261; Lahey v. Lahey, 55 Pitts., 55.
10 Dist., 473; Sunday v. Dietrich, 16 Super., 640.
Building & Loan Assn. v. Bates, 36 C. C., 257.
3
SRobbins v. Farwell, 193 Pa., 37. Bill to settle a partnership account
between partners, one of whom is dead. The survivor cannot testify to
matters that happened prior to death, because others called by himself,
have testified in the same way. Oplinger v. Oplinger, 9 North, 316.
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plained matters about which C had cross-examined him. The
testimony of B did not authorize C to become a witness as to
matters that occurred prior to A's death. "Certainly" says Savidge, P. J., "the living witness whose testimony is to make competent the surviving or remaining party to the record must be
called in the interest of and by the party representing the right
of the deceased. The calling of such witness by the adversary
could not have been in contemplation of the legislature. It was
not the intention of that act to provide so sure and easy a method
of removing the bar of incompetency." 3
Bill in equity to cancel
a deed, on the ground that it was forged. The grantee is dead.
The plaintiff [grantor] cannot call one of the defendants, who are
claiming under the grantee, and, the person thus called testifying that plaintiff executed the deed, testify in contradiction."
SUCCESSIVE QUALIFICATION
While a party, A, may not call a witness to testify to a relevant matter and then, the witness having testified, insist that he
has become competent to testify in regard to the same subject,
if the opposite party, B, insisting that he, B, has become qualified,
testifies, this testimony will qualify A to testify. An illustration
is found in Rudolph v. Rudolph 4 where both parties claimed
land from the same person now dead. The plaintiff called a competent witness to testify to a relevant matter that occurred before
the death~of him who was the source of title, but in the presence
of the plaintiff and defendant. This made defendant competent
to testify to the same relevant matter. When, thus become competent, he testified, he rendered the plaintiff competent to testify
to the same matter. "To permit Jacob (the defendant) to testify
to the relevant matter, to which she [the plaintiff] was a party,
and then close her mouth" says Dean, J., "would work gross inequality between them."
"9Cake v. Cake, 162 Pa., 584. In Gathercole v. Wolf, 7 Kulp., 305,
one of two partners dying, the survivor sued C for the price of a stove
sold to C. C called the surviving partner, who was plaintiff, and then
contradicted him.
4°Lahey v. Lahey, 55 Pitts., 55; Cf. Bowers v. Overfield, 3 North, 81.
41207 Pa., 339.
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WHO MAY BE THE QUALIFYING WITNESS
The witness whose testimony qualifies the surviving party to
the thing or contract in action, or any other person whose interest is adverse to the deceased, is described in the act of 1891
as a person living at the trial and competent to testify. This
person may be a partner of the deceased, or a promisor or promisee. During an action against two defendants, one of them dies.
His administrator is substituted. The defendants call the surviving defendant to testify. This qualifies the plaintiff to testify respecting the same matter, which occurred between him and the
testifying defendant.4 2 When the surviving partner testifies for
those claiming under the partners, one whose interest is adverse
may rebut his testimony.4 " Two parthers sell-a stove. One dying, the survivor sues for the price. The defense, is that the
stove was not as it was warranted to be. If the survivor, plaintiff, testifies that he did not make the warranty, the defendant, is
made competent to prove that he did make the sale and warranty." A claimed in the orphans' court for the price of apples
sold to B, now deceased. B's son testified that he, the son,
bought the apples. This authorized A to testify that he did not
sell the apples to the- son. 5 The qualifying witness therefore
may be an interested witness, as well as a disinterested witness,
if only the interest does not render him incompetent. In the
cases cited, the witness was interested, but concurrently with,
not adversely to, the deceased. He was hence competent.

SCOPE OF THE TESTIMONY FOR WHICH PARTY IS QUALIFIED
-CONTRADICTION
The act of 1891 qualifies a surviving party to a thing or contract in action, or other person who is adverse to the deceased, tq
testify to any relevant matter, to which a competent witness calledi
by the person who represents the deceased, shall have testified.
The qualified witness may therefore contradict the qualifying
42

Proper v. Campbell, 15 Super., 153; Hess' Estate, 22 Lane., 404.
"Huntley v. Goodyear, 182 Pa., 613.
"Gathercole v. Wolf, 7 Kulp, 305.
45Born's Estate, 15 Dist., 544.

DICKINSON

witness.4"

LAW REVIEW

159

Thus in a suit for the price of apples sold to A, now

deceased, if the decedent's son testifies that the apples were sold
to him, the plaintiff may say they were not sold to him.4" In
a distribution of the proceeds of a sheriff's sale, a mortgagee and a
creditor whose judgment was entered on the same day as the
mortgage, claimed, the mortgagee asserting that the judgment
creditor agreed that the mortgage should have priority to the
judgment. The creditor being dead, if his administrator offers

a witness, who was present at the negotiation, and denies that
such an agreement was made, the mortgagee could testify that it
was made."8 Trespass for cutting off of a water supply. The
plaintiff is dead at the trial. A witness for her testified that
he and the plaintiff's husband, and two of the defendants in a conversation agreed to put down pipes, and each pay % of the cost.

This qualified the defendants to call one of these two, to testify
that he was not at any such conversation, and that he did not
participate in any such. 9 Suit on a promissory note. Defendant says that it is a forgery. The plaintiff, claiming under a
deceased assignor, calls a witness who testifies that in a conversation between him and the defendant, the latter admitted that he
had signed the note. This authorized the defendant to contradict.5" In the orphans court, a claim was presented against
McGees' estate, as surety on a note. The effort was to show that
C was liable on the note. A and B testified to conversations with
C, and admissions by him, of facts which would create this liability. This made it competent for C to testify that the facts did
not exist which would create that liability.1 Attempt to sur46

"Karch v. Karcb, 1 Dist., 16; Gathercole v. Wolf, 7 Kulp., 305;
v. Rohner, 772 Pa., 481; Steele v. Nichols, 3 Dist., 517.
Kauss
47
Born's Estate, 15 Dist., 545.
4
Building and Loan Asso. v. Bates, 36 C. C., 257.
49Rudy v. Myton, No. 1, 19 Super., 312.
50
Shannon v. Castner, 21 Super., 294. The witness, otherwise incompetent, may "rebut" the testimony of the qualifying witness, who is one
of the partners, the death of the other of whom has wrought the disqualification. He has no right however to testify to the declarations of the
deceased partner, which were not the subject of the testimony of the
qualifying witness. Huntley v. Goodyear, 182 Pa., 613.
1
Morrison v. Curry, 43 Super., 648. The distinction is not adverted to
between denying the facts and denying the admission of the facts.
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charge in the orphans' court, the administrator, with moneys
which he had belonging to the deceased, at the time of the death
of the latter. A witness for the estate testified to a communication between her and the accountant. This qualified him to contradict and explain the communication. 2
NOT LIMITED TO A BARE CONTRADICTION

The qualified witness is not limited to a bare contradiction.
If, e. g., the competent witness has testified to a conversation
and its contents, the qualified witness may not simply contradict
all or parts of the testimony, but may state his recollection of
what was in fact said.' In an action by A against B, in which,
A dying, his executor, his son, C, was substituted, C testified
for the plaintiff. He had been the agent of his father, had as
such dealt inclusively with B, and he as witness, undertook to
support a running account against B, stating all the items of
debit and credit. B contended that A by contract had bound
himself to make certain repairs on a hotel, which he had not
made. C, as witness, said nothing about this matter. Landis,
P. J., however, holds that B was by this testimony made competent to testify on this matter.4 If the witness testified that an
assignment of a mortgage was made in his presence, the assignor
otherwise disqualified, may testify that it was not an absolute assignment, but only as security for a debt.5
QUALIFIED WITNESS MUST NOT TRANSCEND THE SCOPE
OF THE QUALIFYING TESTIMONY

The witness whose competency springs from the fact that
a qualified witness has testified, is confined to the subjects which
that witness has touched. A witness having testified to a settlement between a ward and his guardian, now dead, but having
said nothing about the receipt by the ward of a sum of $100, the
ward was not made competent to testify that he had never re2
Peterman's Estate, 13 Montg., 169. Possibly, after one party has
called witnesses as to the hand writing of the deceased, the other parties
are competent to testify to such hand writing. York Trust Co. v. Kindig,
7 York, 149.
3
Kauss v. Rohner, 172 Pa., 181.
4
Riecker v. Schwarz, 20 Dsit., 562.
5
Brumbach v. Johnson, 187 Pa., 602.
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ceived the $100.6 If the qualifying witness has not testified to
declarations of X, now dead, under whom one of the parties is
claiming, the surviving party cannot testify to such declarations."
Partners under whom parties claim. One of the partners being
dead, the survivor was called by the person representing his interest. D, an interested person, was thus made competent for the
opposite party to rebut the survivor's testimony, but not to testify
to declarations of the deceased partner, a different subject.' The
party who offers a witness, who, if qualified to testify, is qualified
by the testimony of a witness for the opposite side, must state
enough to show to the court, that the proposed evidence will fall
within the scope of the act of June 11, 1891.'
PECULIAR CASES OF TRANSCENDENCE

The denial by a witness of a fact's occurring in the presence
of A does not, apparently, qualify A to testify that it did occur,
and in his presence. A physician claimed, in the orphans court,
for services rendered to the deceased. Certain witnesses for the
deceased, testified as to the time devoted by the claimant to the
deceased, and as to what occurred during his visits. A witness
testified that at certain times the physician was not present with
the patient. This did not qualify the physician to testify that he
was present with the patient at these times. The witness negatives the presence of the physician. The physician cannot prove
his presence, and then, what services he rendered." The act of
1891 authorizes the witness interested adversely to the deceased
to testify only if the matter has occurred between him and a witness who has testified, or in the presence or hearing, of that~witRoth's Estate, 150 Pa., 261; Rudolph v. Rudolph, 207 Pa., 339; Kauss
v. Rohner, 172 Pa., 481.
7
Acklin v. McCalmont, 201 Pa., 257.
8

Huntley v. Goodyear, 182 Pa., 613. The trial being by referee, the
supreme court thought that D's statements which were not responsive to
any question concerning the declarations of the .deceased partner, were
probably disregarded.
9

Krumrine v. Grenoble, 165 Pa., 98.

McCullom failed to see any-

thing in the testimony of the witness who testified, to qualify the proposed
witness to testify to matters occurring in the lifetime of the person, whose
executor was plaintiff.
10 McGee's Estate, 50 Pitts., 59 (1902).
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ness. When that witness negatives the presence of the witness
who asserts that he is made competent, he cannot by his own testimony establish that presence. Suit by A against the estate of
B for the price of apples sold to B. If a son of B's testifies that
A did not sell the apples to B, A is not made competent to testify
that he did sell them to B. 1
NUMBER OF WITNESSES FOR INTEREST OF DECEASED

The act of June l1th, 1891, speaks of the testimony of
"another person" as qualifying the witness for the surviving
party to a thing or contract in action. But, if one person has testified for the interest of the deceased, as to a matter occurring between him and X, or in the presence or hearing of him and X,
so that X is made competent by the testimony, it would be singular, if that competency should be taken away, because another
person also, was a party to or was present at the occurrence, and
likewise testified to it in behalf of the interest of the deceased.
Rice, P. J., truly observes "A construction under which the defendant would be competent after the first of these witnesses testified, and incompetent after the second had testified to the same
facts, would imply a restriction which the words of the act would
not justify, especially when considered in the light of its remedial
purpose."' 2 In a suit by the administrator of A against B,
plaintiff called himself and another to testify to conversations
with B in A's lifetime, in which B admitted that he was partner
with another person. This qualified B to contradict."
HOW PROVE THAT

RELEVANT MATTER "OCCURRED
TWEEN," ETC.

BE-

The fact that relevant matter testified to by a witness for the
interest of the deceased, occurred "between" certain persons, or
in the presence or hearing of certain persons, must be made to
appear by this witness, or some other witness for the interest of
the deceased,' but it is not necessary that it should be revealed
by the examination in chief of this witness. It may be elicited
"Born's Estate, 15 Dist., 544.
"2Smith v. Summerhill, 31 Super., 235.
"Morrison v. Curry, 43 Super., 648.
"McGee's Estate, 50 Pitts., 59; Brown's Estate, 15 Dist., 544.
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by a cross-examination. Says Porter, J., in an issue to determine how much was due on a judgment note, one of the makers
of which was dead, "the witness [one of and for the defendants]
in her examination in chief, had unequivocally testified that the
agreement [that certain rent should be a credit on the note] had
been made, and the defendants could not deprive the plaintiff of
the benefits of the act of 1891 by refraining from asking her who
were present at the time the agreement was made. This fact the
plaintiff had a right to develop in her cross-examination."'"
DENIAL OF OCCURRENCE "BETWEEN OR IN PRESENCE"

It may be important for the surviving party to deny the fact
of his presence at a conversation or other occurrence. The party
who represents the deceased may urge his silence, as being assent
to a statement made by the decedent to another person (the witness who testifies to it) in the presence of the surviving party.
This party may deny that he was there.'"
DISQUALIFICATIONS

GENERALLY

NOT

OVERRIDDEN

BY

ACT OF 1891

The act of June llth, 1891, declares that any person shall,
"be a competent witness to any relevant matter" if and only if
certain circumstances exist. Its object however, is not to remove
any other incompetency than that which results, under clause e,
of section 5 of the act of 1887, e. g., that which rests on conviction
of perjury; or on being an attorney, or on being a husband or
wife. A wife may sustain by her own testimony her claim to
property which is claimed by next of kin or heirs of her husband,
if she testifies to matters occurring since his death. She may, by
the act of 1891, be made competent, with respect to matters occurring before his death. A brings ejectment against B for land
which had been conveyed to A's husband now dead, but for which
she alleges she paid, so that her husband held it subject to a resulting trust in her favor. After a person has testified for B,
who claims under the husband, to a conversation alleged to have
15Proper v. Campbell, 15 Super., 153. The cross-examination is not
forbidden by Cake v. Cake, 162 Pa., 584.
""Cox v. Cox, 15 Lanc., 45; 12 Montg., 61. The witness here
"thought" that the surviving party was present when the remarks were
made.
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taken place between the plaintiff, her husband, and the witness,
the plaintiff is competent to contradict this testimony.1" The
question is whether a widow had by agreement with her husband,
renounced the right to $300 worth of property at his death. After
his death, she petitioned the court to compel the executor to appraise to her $300 worth of the property. A son-in-law, a daughter and two others testified to the transaction between her and
her husband. She was thus made a competent witness, in rebuttal.""

MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. LOOMIS
Criminal Procedure Act of 1860, Sec. 45-Indictment of Accessory Before
The Fact Lies Only in the Jurisdiction Where Principal is Indictable
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Loomis lived near the Maryland line in York county. Just across
the line lived Jenkins. Loomis hired Phillips to go to Jenkins' stable,
steal his horse, take it to Baltimore, sell it, and give to him, Loomis, half
the proceeds. Phillips stole the horse, but brought it to York and there
sold it and paid half the price received to Loomis. Loomis is indicted
for larceny of the horse.
Barret for plaintiff.
Bender for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
NOWICKI, J. The fact that Phillips brought the horse to York
county instead of taking it to Baltimore, does not lessen the responsibility
of Loomis if he is indictable in Pennsylvania. Clark's Criminal Law,
p. 110. That Phillips, the principal, is not indictable in Pennsylvania, is
well settled in 5 Bing., 617 and 6 Phila., 280.
The question then presents itself whether an accessory before the
fact can be convicted in Pennsylvania if the principal is not amendable
to the laws of Pennsylvania.
The question of jurisdiction is determined by the place where the
offense is completed. 167 Pa., 225.
17Dumbach v. Bishop, 183 Pa., 602.
18
Odenwelder's Estate, 1 Super., 345.
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We think that the offense was -completed in Maryland and Loomis
should be indicted there for it according to the views of Butler, J., as expressed in State v. Grady, 34 Conn., 118, where he says, "It is the highest
injustice that a man should be protected in doing a criminal act here because he is personally out of the State. His act is here although he is
not."
Under the Criminal Procedure Act of 1860, Sec. 45 and the Crimes Act
of 1860, accessories before the fact, although indicted as principals, must
be indicted and tried in the county having jurisdiction of the offense committed by the principal. 14 D. R., 532.
Now, if the principal is not indictable in any county of Pennsylvania,
in which county is the accessory before the fact indictable?
We think that Loomis is not indictable in Pennsylvania. The indictment must be quashed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is said that "by the weight of authority, where a person outside of
a State procures a felony to be committed in the State by a criminal agent,
he is an accessory before the fact and triable as such in the State where
he instigates the crime." 12 Cyc., 208.
If this is a correct statement of the law, (a fact by no means clear),
Loomis could have been indicted and tried as an accessory in Pennsylvania. The question presented by this case, however, is whether he may be
indicted, tried and convicted as a principal.
The right to indict an accessory as a principal is of statutory origin.
In construing the Pennsylvania statute which provides that "an accessory
before the fact to a felony may be indicted, tried and convicted in all
respects as if he were a principal felon," it has been held that the accessory can be tried as principal in only the jurisdiction where the principal felony was committed. C. v. Mentzinger, 14 D. R., 531. This we
accept provisionally as the law of the State.
The judgment of the learned court below is therefore affirmed.
JONES v. SICKLES
Drunkenness of Maker as a Defense to an Action on a Negotiable Note
When the Same is in the Hands of an Innocent Purchaser
for Value
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sickles, when completely intoxicated, signed as co-maker, for the accommodation of the other maker, a negotiable promissory note for $500.00,
payable to Harris. Harris endorsed it, the next day, to Jones who paid
full value and was ignorant of Sickles' intoxication. His intoxication is
urged as a defense.
Leopold for plaintiff.
Hibbard for defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
GARRAHAN, J. There is perhaps, no class of decisions of greater interest or importance to the business community than those which relate
to the validity of commercial paper, and especially its validity in the
hands of an indorsee in good faith and for value.
Here the defendant claims that his complete intoxication at the time
the note was made is a defense as against an innocent purchaser for value.
According to the decisions rendered in this State heretofore it may be seen
that such a defense is of no avail as is evidenced by State Bank v. McCoy,
69 Pa. St., 204, in which it was held that the maker of a negotiable instrument cannot set up the defense against an innocent purchaser of the
note, and in order to defeat the plaintiff's action, actual, not merely constructive notice must be brought home to the plaintiff; and in Pittsburgh
National Bank v. Palmer, 22 Pitts. L. J., 189; McSparren v. Neeley, 91
Pa., 17, it is insufficient to prove facts showing negligence on the part of
the holder of the note for value in not making inquiries as to how the note
was obtained.
Under what is known as "The Negotiable Instruments" Act, May 16,
1901, in section 52, we find, that "A holder in due course" is defined as a
holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
"(1) That it is complete and regular on its face. (2) That he became
holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact. (3) That he took it in good faith
and for value. (4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no
notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in title of the person
negotiating it." The plaintiff having fulfilled the requirements set forth
is a "holder in due course."
In section 65. "To constitute notice of an infirmity in the instrument
or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same, the person to whom
it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to
bad faith." It is obvious then that the Legislature in passing this act
did not intend that the defense of drunkenness should avail as against a
purchaser for value and without notice of such infirmity. And why should
such a defense be admitted. The exigencies of trade require that there
should be no unnecessary impediments to the ready circulation and currency of negotiable paper, but that it should be left free to pass from hand
to hand like bank notes, and perform the functions of money untrammeled
by any equities or defenses between the original parties. If, then, it
should be held that the drunkenness of the maker avoids his note in the
hands of the indorsee, who purchased for a valuable consideration, and ignorant of the maker's intoxication, it is obvious that such a rule would
greatly clog and embarrass the circulation of commercial paper; for no
man could safely take it, without ascertaining the condition of the maker
or drawer when it was given, although there might be nothing suspicious
in its appearance or unusual in the character of the signature. It is evident that it would be a less evil to exclude the defense of drunkenness,
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though it might occasionally work in individual hardships, than to clog
the circulation of Commercial paper, to the great inconvenience of the
public, by admitting such a defense.
Section 57, Act of 1901, "A holder in due course holds the instrument
free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses
available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of
the instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable
thereon." The plaintiff should therefore recover from the defendant.
If drunkenness were admitted to be a good defense and held as such
against an innocent holder, in due course, it would open the doors of perjury, fraud and collusion, which the law endeavors to keep closed. It
would work so vast a hardship upon the commercial world and upon every
purchaser of a negotiable instruinent that this excellent essential and system of business, viz., transferring notes, would have to be completely
obliterated for want of protection. It would give a grand opportunity
for collusion between the maker and the original payee. To illustrate,
suppose A makes a note to B for $1000.00 payable in one year, and it was
free from any defects whatever and A could not possibly enter any defense
against B's collecting it. Then B the next week transferred the note to
C for a valuable consideration. When C presented the note for payment
A says that he was completely intoxicated when he made that note and refuses to pay it. C brings suit and in the interum A goes to B and gives
him $100 to testify in the affirmative to A's statement that he (A) was
drunk when he made the note. It is clearly to be seen that C would be
wrongfully deprived of his money by this collusion. And this fraud could
occur were B to die or leave and his whereabouts be unknown. By admitting drunkenness as a defense it would work untold hardships upon
the commercial world and all concerned in the purchase of notes. To prevent the rise of such conditions, drunkenness cannot be admitted and
therefore the defendant is liable upon his note.
Judgment for plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is conceded that prior to the enactment of the uniform negotiable
instrument law in 1901, it was the law of Pennsylvania that the complete drunkenness of the maker of a negotiable note did not preclude a
recovery thereon by a holder in due course. State Bank v. McCoy, 69
Pa., 204; McSparran v. Neeley, 91 Pa., 1; Bush v. Brenig, 113 Pa., 316.
The same doctrine has been announced by the courts in other jurisdictions.
Smith v. Williamson v. Utah, 219, 30 Pac., 753; Abbeville Trading Co. v.
Butler, 3 Ga. App.,138, 59 S. E., 450; Benton v. Sityka 84 Neb., 808, 24
L. R. A. N. S., 1057, 122 N. W., 61.
The reasons for this doctrine, as stated in Bank v. McCoy, the leading
case, are, (1) that where a loss must be borne by one of two innocent parties, it should be borne by him whose fault occasioned it; (2) that considerations of public policy demand that the circulation of negotiable
paper should not be clogged or embarrassed by the possibility of a latent
defense thereto.
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The reasoning in this case was approved, and the decision followed,
in Smith v. Williamson (supra), and in McSparran v. Neeley (supra),
the court, speaking of the opinion in Bank v. McCoy, said, "Nothing need
be added to these well considered views." The doctrine has also been
approved by some of the text writers. Joyce on Defenses to Commercial
Paper, Sec. 69, 4 A. & E., Encyc., 165.
The reasoning of Bank v. McCoy has not, however, been universally
approved. In Green v. Gunsten (Wis.), 142 N. W., 262, the court, speaking of the first reason of the Pennsylvania court, said, "Drunkenness
alone, without the fraud or fault of another does not lead to the signing
of notes. In every case the drunken maker has been taken advantage of
by a designing payee or a third person and it is not strictly correct to say
that the fault is that of the drunken maker alone. Were that so, there
would be more reason for applying the rule that where loss must fall upon
one of two innocent persons it should fall upon him who occasioned it."
The second reason advanced by the Pennsylvania court has likewise
been criticized. In Green v. Gunsten, it is said, "It is no greater hardship to change a holder in due course with constructive notice of the incapacity of the maker resulting from complete drunkenness than from insanity," and a writer in Case and Comment, vol. 20, p. 480, says, "The
same considerations would preclude the defense of insanity which the
courts admit. Besides, instances where a note is procured from a person
so intoxicated as to be bereft of understanding must be extremely rare,
and the infrequency with which the courts have been asked to pass upon
the validity of this defense indicates that its possibility, would form no
appreciable impediment to the free circulation of commercial paper."
A doctrine contrary to that of the Pennsylvania court is adopted in
Green v. Gunsten. In this case the court seemed to be of the opinion that,
even in absence of statute, the complete drunkenness of the maker would
be a defense against a holder in due course because of the absence of the
aninus contrahendi. The same view is taken in I Daniel on Neg. Inst.,
214, where it is said, "If the drunkenness were so complete as to suspend
all rational thought the better opinion is that any instrument signed by
the party would be entirely void, even in the hands of a holder in due
course, for, altho it may have been the parties own fault that such aberration of mind was produced , when produced, it suspended for the
time being his capability to consent which is the first essential of a contract.
It has been stated, on the one hand, that "the reasoning of the Wisconsin court appears to be sounder than that of the Pennsylvania case and
the decisions which follow it," Case and Comment, vol. 20, p. 481, and,
on the other hand, that to permit the signer, who has voluntarily put himself in a condition in which foolish business acts are likely, to throw the
loss occasioned by his own recklessness on an innocent purchaser would
be unfair." 27 Harvard Law Review, 164.
Were the question an open one in this State, we would be inclined
to favor the rule adopted by the Pennsylvania court. Even the Wisconsin
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court admits that this doctrine "is founded, in part at least, upon substantial grounds of public policy."
The present tendency of the courts is to test the validity of a contract,
not by the actual animus contrahendi, but by the reasonable impression conveyed to the promisee. Williston on Sales, sec. 33. The decisions, manifesting this tendency, which hold that neither insanity nor drunkenness is
a defense to an action upon a contract where the other party acted in good
faith without notice, show that mental disability is not a defense because
of an inherent defect in the contract, but because the law, on considerations of fairness and public policy, under certain circumstances, gives
immunity. See Page on Contracts.
In a case like the present, the considerations of fairness and public
policy favor the plaintiff. As between a drunkard and a holder in due
course, we have no hesitation in preferring the latter.
The act of 1901 has wrought no change in the law. In Green v. Gunsten it was held that under the negotiable instrument law of Wisconsin
the complete intoxication of the maker of a negotiable note was a defense
against a holder in due course but this decision was due to the peculiar
wording"of the Wisconsin statute. Sec. 1676-25 provides that "the title
of a person who negotiates an instrument x x x x is absolutely void when
such instrument or signature was procured from a person who did not know
the nature of the instrument and could not have obtained such knowledge by
the use of ordinary care." Sec. 1676-27 provides that "a holder in due
course holds the instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties,
and free from any defenses available to prior parties among themselves
x x x except where the title of the person negotiating such instrument is void
under section 1676-25 of this act."
Construing the words in italics the Wisconsin court said, "It will be
seen that a holder in due course takes no title where the note was absolutely void in its inception."
The decision of the Wisconsin case might well be questioned on the
ground that if the maker had used ordinary care he would have known the
nature of the instrument, but, in any event, in construing the Pennsylvania
statute it must be entirely disregarded for the simple reason that the
words in italics are not in the Pennsylvania statute. See act of May 16,
1901, sec. 55 and 57, Crawford's Neg. Inst. Law 53.
There is nothing in the Pennsylvania statute which relates even in a
remote way to drunkenness, and as the act specifically provides that "in
any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant shall
govern," we decide that the doctrine of Bank v. McCoy, is still the law of
Pennsylvania.
Judgment affirmed.
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SERGEANT v. MEYERS
Act of June 12th, 1878, P. L., 205
The Liability of Vendee of Land in Assumpsit to Mortgagee, When the
Vendee Purchased the Land "Subject to Mortgage," and an Oral
Promise to Vendor to Pay Mortgage, and Later a Written Promise
to Mortgagee to Pay the Same.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sergeant owns a mortgage for $5000, on real estate bought by Myers
"under and subject to the payment of such mortgage." Myers still owns
the land but he has not paid the mortgage. In this action of assumpsit,
Sergeant has proven that Myers verbally promised the vendor to pay the
mortgage and he has also shown by a letter to him by Myers that the
latter promised him that he would attend to the matter within 30 days, the
letter acknowledging the verbal promise to the vendor.
McKeown for the plaintiff.
Morosini for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
POTTER, J. The first question here is whether the writing satisfies
the act of June 12th, 1878, P. L. 205, and second whether there is privity
of contract between the mortgagee and vendee.
The act enacts that the grantee of land subject to a mortgage or other
encumbrance shall not be personally liable for the payment thereof, unless
he expressly assumed to pay it, in writing or the deed declares in express
words that the conveyance is made on condition that the grantee pay such
encumbrance, and that the words, "under and subject to the payment of
such encumbrance" shall not import the assumption of a personal liability
by the grantee. The person with whom the assumption of liability is made
can alone enforce it, and the liability shall cease as soon as the grantee
has parted with the premises, unless he shall have expressly agreed that
it shall continue.
On page 169, vol. I of Trickett's 'Law of Liens' he says "when the
conveyance was merely under and subject to the payment no personal liability was assumed to the mortgagee" and he cites cases,-Paul v. Casselberry, 8 W. N. C., 334; Stokes v. Williams, 6 W. N. C., 473. And the act
says those words alone will not make the grantee personally liable. But
here we have more, first a verbal assumption, which of course is not sufficient under the act, and second a letter promising thie mortgagee to attend
to the matter within 30 days and also acknowledging the verbal assumption of the debt. Now while I find no cases which hold that this kind of a
writing to be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the act that is that
there be a written agreement expressly assuming the debt yet I think that
the wording here shows that the grantee covenants to pay, and I have
for authority the case Campbell v. Shrum, 3 Watts, 60, in which it was
said no particular form of words is necessary to constitute a covenant.
Whatever shows the intent of the parties to bind themselves to a perfor-
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to the form of expression made use of.
Now as to the question of Privity. There is privity here because of
the letter promising the mortgagee to attend to the matter within 30 days,
and it sidesteps the act which says the liability shall not enure to any
other than the one with whom the agreement was made because the agreement was made with the mortgagee and besides 27 Cyc., 1349-50 says a
contract or covenant by which a purchaser of mortgaged land assumes
and agrees to pay the mortgage debt -to
the benefit of the mortgagee
although the latter is not directly a party to it. Cites cases Blood v.
Crew, Stevick Co., 177 Pa., 606 and The Republic Building and Loan Association v. Christiana G. Webb, 12 Pa. Super. Court, 545.
There is consideration to support the agreement of vendee toward the
mortgagee, hence because of this and the rest there is privity.
The statute of frauds does not enter because the debt is vendee's
own and even if it did enter there is a writing to satisfy it.
In conclusion I might cite cases which hold "a recital in a conveyance
that the grantee takes under and subject to a mortgage is a covenant of
indemnity only as between the grantor and grantee for the protection of
grantor, and does not make grantee liable to the mortgagee for the payment of the debt in the absence of circumstances showing an implied
agreement to discharge it. Taylor v. Mayer, 93 Pa., 42; Davis Appeal, 89
Pa., 272; Samuel v. Taylor, 88 Pa., 465; Moores Appeal 88 Pa., 458; Girard Life Insurance Co. v. Stewart, 86 Pa., 89. But in this case there is
an agreement to discharge the debt.
The case Meniman v. Moore, 90 Pa., 78, held even though there is
no clause in the conveyance imposing personal liability upon the transferee
he assumes such liability by a collateral agreement either written or oral.
And here there was a written agreement.
Now in view of the satisfaction of the act and the answer to the contention of no privity the court allows the mortgage to recover the $5000.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
A having land on which was a mortgage, has conveyed it to Myers,
"under and subject to the payment of such mortgage." If the mortgage
was on the land, the conveyance of the land could not divest it. Tbe land
would necessarily continue, as it had been, under and subject to it.
But, the acceptance by Myers of a deed containing these words, did
imply a promise by him, a promise, not to pay the mortgage, either to the
grantor or to Sergeant, the mortgagee, but to reimburse the grantor if
he should be compelled by the mortgagee or his assignee, to pay all or any
part of the mortgage debt. May's Estate, 218 Pa., 64.
It does not appear that the grantor has been compelled to pay or has
paid, any part of the mortgage debt. The liability to indemnify him has
not, therefore, accrued.
But, it is proved that Myers verbally promised his vendor to pay the
mortgage. If Lennox v. Brower, 160 Pa., 191, can be depended upon, this
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verbal promise would be enforceable by the promisee, notwithstanding the
act of June 12th, 1878. But, Wunderlich v. Sadler, 189 Pa., 469, is inconsistent with Lennox v. Brower.
, It is conceded, apparently, in Lennox v. Brower that the act of 1878
applies to the right of the mortgagee to compel payment from Myers. In
order that the mortgagee may sue on Myers' promise, he must "by an
agreement in writing have expressly assumed a personal liability" or the
deed to him must contain "express words" "stating that the grant is
made on condition of the grantee assuming such liability." The phrase
"under and subject," etc, is not such "express words," etc.
Has he, Myers then expressly assumed liability in writing? Clearly
not. He "verbally promised the vendor to pay the mortgage."
Myers however has admitted in writing, that he made the verbal
promise. The admission was made, not to the vendor, but to the mortgagee. It was made, not as a part of the transaction of purchase of the
land, but we know not how long subsequently to the consummation of the
conveyance. We do not deem such written evidence of an oral agreement
the equivalent of the statutory "agreement in writing."
It is difficult to justify allowing the vendor to enforce a verbal promise, and refusing to allow the mortgagee to enforce it. There might be
objection to permitting one not a party to the promise, but who would be
benefited by the performance of it, to enforce it, but requiring a writing
when the mortgagee is to enforce it, and being content with a verbal
promise when the vendor is to enforce it, seems to be making a puerile
distinction.
In Lennox v. Brower, it is implied that the mortgagee can enforce a
verbal promise, if he can persuade the vendor to allow his name, as plaintiff, to the use of the mortgage. In Wunderlich v. Sadler, 189 Pa., 469,
the contrary is implied.
The decisions thus far pronounced on the act of 1878, have left it
absolutely unintelligible. They and it should be eliminated by new legislation. Meantime we must hold that the mortgagee, who has not procured
the use of the name of the vendor, cannot enforce an unwritten promise of
a vendee to pay the mortgage.
Judgment reversed.
POWELL v. WATERMAN
Bailment-Conversion-The Effect of Driving a Hired Horse Further
Than the Contract of Hiring Provided For-What Amounts to Conversion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Waterman hired a horse from plaintiff to drive to Mt. Holly and return. He had occasion to drive five miles further. On his way back to
Carlisle from Mt. Holly, the horse died, the death is no way being the
result of Waterman's driving. Powell sues Waterman in conversion.
Rosenberg for the plaintiff.
Pifer for the plaintiff.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
YATES, J. Altho there appears to be a division of authority throughout the country in regard to the question presented in the case at bar,
yet the majority of decisions tend to cling to the general doctrine first laid
down in Wheelock v. Wheelright, 5 Miass., 104, that if one hires a horse
to go a certain place, and drives beyond that place, it is a conversion of
the horse, and the hirer is liable for all damages subsequently occurring
altho arising from the fault of the horse. Lucas v. Trumbull, 15 Gray,
307; Welch v. Mohr, 93 Cal., 371; McNeil v. Brooks, 1 Yerg, 73; Rotch
v. Hawes, 12 Pick, 136; Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N., 16-67; Brown &
Co. v. Baker Co., 15 Weekly Notes, 60.
The counsel for the defendant claims that such an act, namely the
bailee's direct use of his rights granted in the contract of bailment, is
not a conversion.
Cooley says, -"If one hires a horse to go a certain place, and drives
him to another, this is a conversion, tho he return him to the owner.
American and English Ency. states,-"That where a horse is hired
to ride or drive to one place, and it is ridden or driven beyond that distance, this constitutes a conversion.
Judge Story in his works on bailments says,-"There is on the part
of the hirer an implied obligation, not only to use the thing with due care
and moderation, but also not to apply it to any other use than that for
which it was hired. So if a carriage and horses are for a journey to
Boston, the hirer has no right to go with them on a journey to New York.
So if the horses are hired for a week, the hirer has no right to use them
a month. And it may be generally stated that if a thing is used for a
different purpose from that which was intended by the parties, or in a
different manner, or for a longer period, the hirer is not only responsible
for all damages, but if a loss afterwards occurs, altho by inevitable casualty, he will generally be responsible therefore. In short, such misuser is
deemed at common law a conversion of the property, for which the hirer
is generally held responsible, to the lender to the full extent of the loss."
This doctrine proceeds upon the idea, not of contract, but of trust;
not of an intention on the part of the bailee actually to convert the property to his own use, but of his wilful disregard of the object or purpose
of the trust; not that the misuser, for instance driving the horse beyond
the place named in the contract, is conclusive evidence of the bailee's intention to convert the animal to his own use, but rather upon the ground
that such use of the property is so substantial an invasion of the owner's
rights, and so inconsistent with the idea of an existing bailment, that the
bailee cannot reasonably object to the bailor's treating the bailment as
terminated thereby, or to his proceeding against the bailee for a conversion. For while the bailee has a special property in the thing, his property in it is qualified and limited by the object or purpose for which it
was delivered and the bailor is as much the owner as he was before, altho
temporarily out of possession. Therefore when the bailee disregards the
reasonable limit of his right, and wilfully steps beyofid it, he invades the
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dominion of the bailor. It follows that by such misuser the bailee becomes
guilty of a conversion of the thing bailed, for "a conversion consists in
an illegal control in the thing converted, inconsistent with the plaintiff's
right of property." Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N. H., 71.
The counsel for the defendant contends that the horse did not die while
outside of the limits stipulated in the contract and therefore it was not a
conversion. But as soon as the defendant drove any distance past the
place designated in the contract, which was Mt. Holly, the bailment terminated and there was a conversion, and then the defendant would be
liable for any injury subsequently resulting to the horse.
Conversion is based upon the idea of an assumption by the defendant
of a right property or a right of dominion over the thing converted, which
casts upon him all the risks of an owner, and it is therefore, not every
wrongful intermeddling with, or wrongful asportation or wrongful detention of personal property that amounts to a conversion. Acts which
themselves imply an assertion of title or of a right of dominion over personal property, such as a sale, letting or destruction of it, amounts to a
conversion, even tho the defendant may have honestly mistaken his rights;
but acts which do not in themselves imply an assertion of title, or of a
right of dominion over such property, will not sustain an action of trover,
unless done with the intention to deprive the owner of it permanently or temporarily, etc.
In the case at hand it was clearly the intention of both bailee and bailor
that the former should only drive to Mt. Holly and return, and when he
deliberately drove five miles further than this place, he was undoubtedly
depriving the owner of the horse temporarily and using it for a different
purpose than that for which he had contracted. He intended to break the
contract, and by so doing he asserted title to the horse temporarily, which
constituted a conversion.
A bailee has not the right to make use of the property in any way not
evidently contemplated by the parties to the contract of bailment. Should
he do so either in a different manner, for a different purpose, or for a
longer time than was agreed upon, he is guilty of a conversion of the
property. 5 Lyc., 176.
One who hires a horse for a specified journey becomes liable for any
damage arising from his driving the animal for a further journey. 25
Cyc., 1514.
Foules v., Willoughby, 8 M. & F., 540, is a leading case establishing
the necessity in order to constitute a conversion, of proving an intention
to exercise some right or control over the property inconsistent with the
right of the lawful owner, when the act done is equivocal in its nature.
The breach of the contract of bailment was an intention to exercise a
right over the property inconsistent with the lawful owner's rights.
This case is one of hardship wherever the loss may fall. The defendant no doubt had no intention of injuring the property he had hired or of
wronging its owners, What he did, good men often do without a thought
of harm; after starting on his journey he found occasion to continue his
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course for a few miles. This under the terms of the hiring he had no right
to do, however innocently he did it, and he was thereby guilty of a conversation of the property.
Altho Pa. cases analogous to this one in question, are unusually rare,
yet Grown & Co. v. Baker, reported in 15 Weekly Notes, 60-held that
where one hired a team and wagon to go and return from a particular
place by a specified route, and he deviated from said route in going and
returning by a round-about way, and stopping at another place, where the
team was destroyed by accident-the hirer was liable in trover for the
value of the team.
Gobleigh v. Newell, vol. 17,D. L. R. 148, which was decided for the defendant, was in a great respect different from the present case. There
the contract was only broken as to the mode of shipping a horse and no
injury whatever befell said horse, and the horse was not delayed to such
an extent as to injure the plaintiff. The learned judge states that "the
trend of modernism is to disregard little technicalities and render decisions as the justice of the case demands." Yet here the technicality was
of such a lesser degree than that in the case at bar as to warrant such a
decision on his part.
Therefore, altho in Doolittle v. Shaw, an Iowa case, it was held that
a mere deviation from the line of travel, or going beyond the point for
which a team was hired will not, without more, amount to a conversion
of the property for which an action will lie-yet I cannot reconcile this
judge's decision with the weight of authority to the contrary and I feel
warranted in rendering judgment for the plaintiff.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The practical question before the court is, was the defendant liable
to pay to the plaintiff the value of the horse?
The horse has died. For whom, the bailor or the bailee, shall its
death be a loss? The bailor thinks it a loss for the bailee. Why?
Did the bailee purposely cause the death? If he did, it would be easy
to convince ourselves that he is liable for its value. But he did not purposely cause it.
Did he negligently cause the horse's death? Not at all. No act
that he did or omitted to do, produced the death. He cannot be liable for
the value of the horse because of any causal relation between himself and
its death.
Is the defendant liable for its value because of any trespass upon the
horse? None appears damages for which could be admeasured by the
value of the horse.
Is the defendant liable for breach of the contract, to the extent of the
horse's value? There was a breach of contract. The horse was to be
driven to Mt. Holly Springs and thence back to Carlisle. It was driven
to a point five miles beyond. The damage.for this breach would probably
be the value of the motor power of a horse, for the space of ten miles.
This seems the view of the legislature, which, in the act of April 27th,
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1909, P. L., 248, requires the hirer of a horse who exceeds the distance
mentioned in the contract, to report on his return the excess, and to
compensate the owner for it.
This act enacts that the rate charged by the owner, for the further or
greater distance than contracted for, shall in no case be in excess of the
rate per mile originally charged or agreed upon.
The plaintiff proceeds upon a fictitious ground. He construes the
departure beyond Mt. Holly Springs as a so-called "conversion" of the
horse, as, in other words, an act which warrants his treating the defendant
as having by that act become the owner, and thus holding him liable for
the value of the horse at that time.
There are statements in various decisions that give countenance to
this position. We have never seen any plausibility in them. Nor do we
now. The act of driving five miles beyond Mt. Holly Springs is doubtless indefensible. But how can it be said to involve a denial of the ownership of the property or be expressive of a purpose to dispute that ownership? Is every act done to another's chattel, which the owner has not
warranted, an appropriation, a "conversion?"
After the departure beyond Mt. Holly Springs, and the return thereto,
and while on the route therefrom to Carlisle, "the horse died, but not
from the effects of the driving." There are cases which say that, if the
death had been the effect of the driving, it would have justified the assumption that the horse had been converted. Why? How? If the acts
done by the bailee were not a conversion, how could sundry effects of such
acts make them such? The judicial philosophers do not aid us to see how.
But Westerman's acts did not cause the death. Shall the death,
nevertheless be held to make the driving beyond Mt. Holly Springs "a
conversion." There are doubtless dicta and decisions that imply that it
would. The reason is inscrutable. A vague idea of punishing bailee for
not observing the limits of the contract, by making him liable for the
value of the thing bailed, if it perishes or is injured, probably underlay the
doctrine. We find ourselves unable to adopt it. Probably in declining
to adopt it, we show disrespect to many decisions. The courts however,
are not unanimous.
In Daugherty v. Reveal, N. E. Rep., 381 (Ind.) and in Cirney v.
Rease Co., N. Va., 676, 55 S. E. 722; 1 Wigmore, Cases on Torts, 669,
the courts refused to find a "conversion" in the transgression of the contract limits of the journey, although the death of the horse followed it, not
being however the consequence of it. Cf. also a learned note on the
former of these cases in the current Harvard Law Review, p. 175. We
see no reason for holding that Westerman is responsible for the death of
the horse.
It was apparently the intention of the legislature, in enacting the
statute of 1909 supra, that one who travelled beyond the terminus agreed
upon, should be liable only for compensation for the extra distance, at
the rate per mile contracted for. The mere fact that the horse's death
intervened, not caused by the act of the bailee, should not vary the rule.
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With reluctance then, we must reach a conclusion different from that
so learnedly and ably defended by the opinion of the court below.
Reversed.

AUGUST, ADMR. OF ADAMS v. FARMERS' BANK
Agency-Effect of Death of Principal Upon Agent's Authority-When
Principal is Drawer of Check and the Bank is the Agent-Notice of
Death Essential to Revoke Authority.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Adams, a depositor in the bank drew a check on it for $300, payable
to Hendrickson. Two days later Adams died in a distant city, and six
hours after his death, the check being presented to the bank by Hendrickson, endorsee, was paid. The bank did not know, nor did the endorsee,
of the previous death of Adams. This is a suit by the Administrator of
Adams to recover the money. Adams died able to pay only sixty per cent.
of his debts.
Watkins for the plaintiff.
Sharp for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
O'RORKE, J. The point involved in this case is one on which there
seems to be a surprising rarity of decisions in Pennsylvania. Briefly
stated, the question on which this decision hinges is whether a bank is
liable to the administrator of a dead depositor, for money paid on the
decedent's check a short time after his death, without notice of said drawer's decease.
A check is a draft or money order on a bank for the payment of money.
14 Forum 153. The payment of a check is a transaction, arising, originally, out of an understanding between the depositor and the bank, and
involves the rights and duties of three parties, viz., the drawer or depositor, the drawee and the payee. It is an order by the maker on the
bank to pay someone else his (maker's) money. In some jurisdictions,
checks are considered assignments of the money they represent, of the
amount specified. This is not the Pennsylvania doctrine. Harrisburg
National Bank's Appeal, 10 W. N. C., 41; 13 Forum 98 (and cases cited)
Act May 16, 1901, sec. 89, Bank v. McM., 106 Pa., 460.
The cases which hold that the death of the drawer does not revoke
the bank's authority to pay a check are all based on the theory that a
check is an assignment of the whole or part of a deposited fund. Such
decisions have been made on the theory that such check passes the amount
specified to the payee es instanti, when the check is given to him, and
that it then becomes irrevocable. 56 L. R. A., 174, and cases cited. In
Raesser v. National Exchange Bank, 56 L. R. A., 175; Taylor's Estate,
154 Pa., 183. The court cautiously evades a direct decision on the point,
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by saying, "The drawer cannot arbitrarily, without cause, stop payment
on a check; such conduct would be fraud. If death of a drawer revokes
a check, it is no more efficacious than a revocation by the living party.
The law will not of its own motion work the same fraud which it would
not permit a person to perpetuate by his own act." The Missouri courts
have gone farther and declared that the death of the maker does not revoke a check given for value. But in the later cases, the doctrine has
been stated less boldly, and even evaded ................ 74 Mo., 95.
And it seems to be the law in States which do consider a check an
assignment of a fraud or part of it, that death of the drawer works a revocation. 12 L. R. A., 302-Bernard v. Whitney National Bank, 18 Cyc.,
879. The reason given for the rule is that at the death of the assignor,
his property passes to his creditors and heirs; the rights of the former
being then fixed, so that no one may receive a preference over the other.
18 Cyc., 879. This also seems to be the reason for the Pennsylvania rule.
In Pennsylvania, the death of the drawer revokes a check; "but is
this" comes the question "regardless of the presence or absence of notice,
or payment with or without notice of such death." 14 Forum 147. In
this State, it seems to be a settled rule that upon the death of the drawer
of a check the bank loses its authority to pay, such death effecting a
countermand of the authority. Saylor v. Bushong, 100 Pa., 23 and 12
W. N. C., 81; 171 Pa., 55, Kenis Est,, Gilpuis Appeal; Walsh v. Kennedy,
2 W. N. C. 437 and 9 Phila., 178 ;Hawleys Estate, 32 C.C., 160 (citing 171
Pa., 55 supra).
Saylor v. Bushong (supra) holds that a check may be revoked before
presentment, by the death of the drawer, but if not revoked (i.e. in any
manner?) the bank must pay on demand. This does not mean that it cancels the debt; it simply revokes the bank's authority to pay on the check.
The drawer is still liable to the payee; Nagles Estate, 134 Pa. 31; 14
Forum 147. But it does discharge the bank from liability to the holder.
National Bank of Tamaqua v. Shoemaker, 117 Pa., 94; Saylor v. Bushong,
Supra; 31 Stperior (Pa.) 647; 2 P. & L. Dig. of Dec., 2842, for the bank
need not accept such check. But it is lidble to the drawer if it does not
give good reason for such dishonor, and it may not keep the check for
several days. Bank v. McMichael, 106 Pa. 460. This rule seems to put
the bank in a dilemma; it loses either way, as it is subject to an action
for either the honor or dishonor; in case of death of the drawer (for honoring) by the drawer's administrator; and in case of his maker's) survival, by the holder, for not honoring the check. Must the bank decide.
to honor or dishonor a check at its peril? We think it must. The broad
unqualified rule stated in Kern's Estate, (supra) is supported by citations
of three text books. (1) Daniel's Neg. Ins., §179-180. (2) Chilty, Bills,
185. (3) Byles, Bills, 144. The doctrine as stated there is "The delivery
of a promissory note or check is not an executed gift of the money, but
remains revocable, and is revoked by the death of the promisor before
actual payment."
The authorites hold that it is the "death" of the maker of a check which
revokes it, automatically; it seems that no notice, actual or (reas-
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onably) constructive need be shown. We do not believe the statement
made in Bromley v. Com. National Bank of Pa., 9 Phila., 522, is soundthat "if a bank pay a check before notice of the death of the drawer, such
payment is good. In that case it was "not known whether the death occurred before or after payment," and the decision was based on the
assumption that the drawer was living, when payment was made, and that
there was no countermand of the bank's authority (as there is by such
"death"). No doubt "the holder had the right to receive the money," but
his right was as against the drawer's estate.
Whatever the rule may be in other jurisdictions (5 Cyc., 540) it seems
settled in Pennsylvania that the right of a bank to pay a check depends
directly upon its relation of agency to the depositor; that this agency is
governed by the general principle common to agencies that the death of
the principal works a revocation of the agent's authority, ipso facto. 14
Forum 147.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Farmers' Bank, in the case at
bar, had no authority to pay the amount of the check to Hendrickson,
and that upon suit of Adam's administrator, August, it will have to return the amount of the check to the insolvent estate. The only reason
for this rule that appears, is that while no preference of the payee was
intended, as against the other creditors of the estate, still it was in actual
effect a preference, if, the bank's payment was valid.
Whether or not the Bank may recover the unauthorized payment back
from Hendrickson, is not decided, it not being necessary to a decision of
this case. Probably it can, by appropriate action, and we believe that it
not only could but should have a remedy to prevent a double liability for
a single sum.
Judgment is hereby given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
We regret that we are constrained to come to a decision which differs
from that of the learned court below.
The adjudications upon the subject presented in this case are very few.
Text writers refer frequently to Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr., 118, as sustaining the doctrine that a bank will be protected from a second payment
of a deposit, which has made one payment of it, in obedience to the depositor's check, although when it paid, the depositor had died, if it was
ignorant of the death. Upon this point, the case says nothing. It contains
a dictum of the judge, that, if the payee of a check had received payment
of it from the bank on which it was drawn, after but in ignorance of the
death of the drawer, he would not be compelled to pay the money back.
In Rogerson v. Ladbroke, 1 Bing., 94 (1822) it was held that if a bank
charged against a customer's deposit, an accepted bill of the depositor,
after, but in ignorance of, the death of the depositor it could not be compelled to pay the amountthus charged to the administrator of the depositor.
"It is impossible," says Dallas, C. J., "to contend that bankers, having
no notice of death of a party, are not entitled when his bill becomes due,
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to reimburse themselves out of his funds in their hands, the amount of
that bill which they have before discounted." It would be difficult to
justify a distinction between its implied right to deduct a discounted bill
or note of the customer from his deposit, and its express right to pay
checks and to deduct the amount paid thereon, from the deposit.
Byles, in the 6th edition of Bills, p. 25, observes, "It seems that the
death of the drawer of a check is a countermand of the bank's authority
to pay it. But that, if the bank pay the check before notice of the death,
the payment is good." The only case cited, however, is Tate v. Hilbert.
supra.
Morse, in the 2d edition of his works on Banking, p. 278, says "The
death of the drawer before payment of the check, operates as an absolute
revocation of the power of the bank to pay upon his check. As an incident of his death, the title to his balance rests in his legal representatives,
and his own order is no longer competent to withdraw any part of that
which is no longer his own property. It is laid down in the text books
quite generally that if the payment be made by the bank in ignorance of
the death of the drawer, the bank will be protected. Doubtless this would
be so held. But it must be acknowledged that the cited case of Tate v.
Hilbert which the text books all rely upon as their sole authority for the
statement, does not touch upon the point and furnishes no basis for
considering that the rule has the support of so much as a single adjudicated cause."
Among text-writers who state the rule that the death of the drawer,
unknown to the bank, does not withdraw its right to pay the check, are
Parsons, Tiedeman, Chitty, Edwards, Daniel.
A check is not an assignment of the deposit. In so far as Bromley v.
Bank, 9 Phila.. 522, implies that it is, that case is erroneous.
Cases cited by the learned court below establish the principle that the
death of the drawer of a check before its payment revokes the bank's
authority to pay. But they do not determine whether the bank's payment
after death, in ignorance of the death, is to be treated, exceptionally, as
a good payment.
If Cassidy v. McKenzie, 4 W. & S., 282, is still law in Pennsylvania, it
is difficult to hold that a revocation of the authority of a debtor conferred
by his creditor to pay the debt to a third person, is wrought by the death
of the creditor, of which when making the payment, the debtor has no
knowledge. The bank is a debtor to the depositor, having authority to discharge the debt by payments to third persons, if the creditor directs him
to make such payments.
Glennan v. Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 102 N. E., 537, is the
only case in which, so far as we know, the exact question has been decided.
Admitting the absence of adjudications, the Court of Errors of New York,
yielding largely to the prevailing consensus, as manifested by the text
book writers, determines, in the language of the syllabus, that "The rule
that an agent's authority is revoked by the death of the principal without
notice, does not apply to the payment of a check by a bank without knowl-
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edge of the drawer's death, since such an application would be utterly
impracticable and contrary to the almost universally accepted rule of law."
The estate of Adams is insolvent. If Hendrickson was a creditor, he
may have received 100 per cent. of his debt by means of the bank's payment, while other creditors are receiving only 60 per cent. It would be
impracticable however, to make the bank's right to pay a check contingent
on the condition of the estate of the drawer. Months or years might elapse
after his death before its sufficiency to pay debts in full could be determined. It may be remarked however, that so far as appears, the check
payable to Hendrickson, was not intended to pay a debt, and, if it was. it
may have been intended to pay only 60 per cent. of a debt which was $500.
It follows that the judgment of the learned court below must be reversed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Jurisdiction and Procedure in United States Courts, by Robert M. Hughes,
M. A. Second Edition. Published by the West Publishing Company,
St. Paul, Minn., 1913.
This, the second edition, is a evry meritorious book. Since the first
edition was issued, the judicial code has been enacted and gone into operation, abolishing the circuit courts and making other important innovations. The first chapter deals with the source of the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. In the next 15 chapters are dealt with the functions and
procedure of the District Courts. After these follow a chapter on other
courts of original jurisdiction, and 6 chapters on the appellate courts and
on procedure therein and in the other courts. One chapter deals with the
criminal jurisprudence of the district courts; another with its jurisdiction
in cases of forfeiture and seizures and of admiralty. To the important
subject of bankruptcy four chapters are allotted. The topic of the work
is scientifically analyzed. A due proportion is observed in the allocation
,ofspace to the various sub-divisions. The decisions are not only clear but
interesting. It may be said without exaggeration that every American
lawyer, whether he has or expects practice in the federal courts, or not,
should be familiar with all the facts of structure and function of these
courts which are set forth in this book. So familiar, he will have a sound
understanding of the way in which the state judicial system is related to
the national, an understanding surely, which every educated lawyer-it is
of course too much to expect it of every educated citizen-should possess.
We cordially recommend the book.

